Wang, Zhen; Jusup, Marko; Guo, Hao; Shi, Lei; Geček, Sunčana; Anand, Mathur; Perc, Matjaž; Bauch, Chris H.; Kurths, Jurgen; Boccaletti, Stefano; Schnellhuber, Hans Joachim
(2020)
Communicating sentiment and outlook reverses inaction against collective risks.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 117
(30).
pp. 17650-17655.
ISSN 0027-8424
Abstract
Collective risks permeate society, triggering social dilemmas in
which working toward a common goal is impeded by selfish interests. One such dilemma is mitigating runaway climate change. To
study the social aspects of climate-change mitigation, we organized an experimental game and asked volunteer groups of three
different sizes to invest toward a common mitigation goal. If
investments reached a preset target, volunteers would avoid all
consequences and convert their remaining capital into monetary
payouts. In the opposite case, however, volunteers would lose
all their capital with 50% probability. The dilemma was, therefore, whether to invest one’s own capital or wait for others
to step in. We find that communicating sentiment and outlook
helps to resolve the dilemma by a fundamental shift in investment patterns. Groups in which communication is allowed invest
persistently and hardly ever give up, even when their current
investment deficits are substantial. The improved investment patterns are robust to group size, although larger groups are harder
to coordinate, as evidenced by their overall lower success frequencies. A clustering algorithm reveals three behavioral types
and shows that communication reduces the abundance of the
free-riding type. Climate-change mitigation, however, is achieved
mainly by cooperator and altruist types stepping up and increasing contributions as the failure looms. Meanwhile, contributions
from free riders remain flat throughout the game. This reveals
that the mechanisms behind avoiding collective risks depend
on an interaction between behavioral type, communication, and
timing.
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